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From Nagasaki to Toronto
Omond Solandt and the Defence Research Board’s Early 
Vision of Atomic Warfare, 1945-1947
Jason S. Ridler
Omond McKillop Solandt’s selection in 1945 as the founding 
director general of the Defence 
Research Board (DRB), Canada’s 
first peacetime defence research 
organization, owed much to his 
experience in the investigation of 
the results of the nuclear attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From 
October to December 1945, Colonel 
Solandt,2 a physiologist and pioneer 
in operational research, headed the 
British ﬁeld team that examined the 
number and nature of casualties from 
the atomic bombs. Thus in 1945 he 
was the only Canadian ofﬁcer with 
ﬁrst hand expertise on the reality of 
atomic weapons.3 
 Upon becoming director-general 
of the DRB Solandt made it his top 
priority to share this expertise in 
a series of lectures for Canadian 
leaders in industry, medicine, and 
civil defence, as well as the military. 
These lectures, by Canada’s leading 
defence scientist, provide a frank 
and detailed account at the dawn of 
the nuclear age of atomic weapons 
about the damage Canadian cities 
would suffer in a nuclear war. For 
Solandt atomic war was no theory 
but a reality that had to be confronted 
in two ways. First, there had to be 
a concerted international effort for 
a stable peace. Second, given the 
likelihood that such an endeavour 
would fail, Canadian leaders had to 
understand nuclear warfare and be 
prepared for the worst. For Solandt, 
this realistic understanding was 
the critical component of “active 
defence” in the Cold War. One of 
the DRB’s chief responsibilities for 
national defence, in his view, was to 
impart that understanding. 
Career Highlights 1930-1945
Solandt came to military affairs by circumstance rather than 
inclination. Born in Winnipeg in 
1909 to a clergyman and a university- 
educated mother, young Solandt 
held a wide array of interests which 
eventually led him to study science 
at the University of Toronto in 1927. 
He received gold medal standing 
for his bachelor thesis in biological 
and medical science in 1931 before 
beginning his master’s in physiology 
under the guidance of Dr. Charles 
Best, the co-discoverer, alongside 
Sir Frederick Banting, of insulin.4 
Best would introduce Solandt to 
his Cambridge mentors, including 
Sir Alan Drury. Under Drury’s 
guidance, Solandt received his 
doctorate of medicine (MD) in 1936, 
and passed the dreaded exams set for 
membership in the Royal College of 
Physicians in 1939; a stellar rise for a 
young Canadian.5
 Solandt was set to teach courses 
on mammalian physiology but 
the start of the Second World War 
changed that. Over the next six years, 
he distinguished himself in senior 
medical and defence research posts. 
He was the director of the Southwest 
London Blood depot (1940) during 
the early German bombing campaign 
against London. He was then assigned 
by the Medical Research Council to 
Although Canada did not embark on an atomic weapons programme, and indeed actively supported proposals for 
atomic disarmament, nonetheless the Canadian Services had to be trained and equipped to ﬁght in atomic wars should 
the need ever arise. Helping in this task was the central role of the Defence Research Board.1
O.M. Solandt, 1958
ABSTRACT: In November 1945, Canadian 
physiologist Colonel Omond Solandt 
became one of a handful of experts 
on the effects of atomic warfare as 
a member of the British Mission to 
Japan (BMJ). The BMJ investigated the 
effects of the atomic bombs dropped 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both 
on structures and people. Solandt’s 
casualty analysis and experience in 
Japan became the prism by which his 
pragmatic intellect viewed atomic 
affairs during his tenure as Chairman 
of Canada’s Defence Research Board 
(1946-1956), including the impact of 
atomic war on Canada.
© Canadian Military History, Volume 18, Number 2, Spring 2009, pp.26-40.
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director general of the Defence 
Research Board (DRB), Canada’s 
first peacetime defence research 
organization, owed much to his 
experience in the investigation of 
the results of the nuclear attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From 
October to December 1945, Colonel 
Solandt,2 a physiologist and pioneer 
in operational research, headed the 
British ﬁeld team that examined the 
number and nature of casualties from 
the atomic bombs. Thus in 1945 he 
was the only Canadian ofﬁcer with 
ﬁrst hand expertise on the reality of 
atomic weapons.3 
 Upon becoming director-general 
of the DRB Solandt made it his top 
priority to share this expertise in 
a series of lectures for Canadian 
leaders in industry, medicine, and 
civil defence, as well as the military. 
These lectures, by Canada’s leading 
defence scientist, provide a frank 
and detailed account at the dawn of 
the nuclear age of atomic weapons 
about the damage Canadian cities 
would suffer in a nuclear war. For 
Solandt atomic war was no theory 
but a reality that had to be confronted 
© Canadian Military History, Volume 18, Number 2, Spring 2009, pp.26-40.
The atomic explosion at 
Nagasaki, 9 August 1945.
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create and direct the Physiological 
Laboratory at the Armoured Fighting 
Vehicles School at Lulworth Cove in 
Dorset. At Lulworth, Solandt and 
his team solved a crew problem by 
improving ventilation in armoured 
vehicles, and he soon became a 
pioneer in operational research.6 This 
success resulted in his assignment in 
1942 to the British Army Operational 
Research Group (AORG).7 The 
following year Solandt became deputy 
to the AORG’s superintendent, 
the South African radar pioneer 
Basil Schonland, whom Solandt 
greatly admired.8 By February 1944, 
Solandt joined the Canadian army 
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. 
When Schonland was selected to 
become science advisor (SA) to 
Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery for 
the Normandy campaign in 1944, 
Solandt became superintendent of 
the BAORG with the rank of colonel.9 
After the German surrender in May 
1945, he received the appointment 
as science advisor to Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, commander-in-chief of 
South-East Asian Command and was 
prepared to depart for Burma when 
the atomic bombs were dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
1945. The selection of a Canadian 
physiologist to get ﬁrst hand data on 
atomic warfare largely rested on his 
medical training, his wartime record 
of excellence in managing a host 
of technological endeavours, and a 
pragmatism that matched his strong 
and meticulous intellect. All would 
be needed in the mission to Japan. 
The US Strategic       
Bombing Survey 
On 3 November 1944 President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s 
request for the creation of a survey 
mission to conduct a “scientific 
investigation of all the evidence” of 
strategic bombing in the European 
Theatre that would provide the data 
needed for assessing post war strategic 
planning. The United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey (USSBS) came 
under leadership of Colonel Franklin 
D’Olier, President of Prudential Life 
Insurance Company.10 
 After the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President 
Harry S Truman authorized a mission 
for the Paciﬁc. On 15 August 1945 
Truman suggested to D’Olier that:
[I]t would be similarly valuable for 
our post-war planning and future 
policies to have the same kind of 
impartial and expert study of the 
effects of our aerial efforts in the 
war against Japan. This study would 
include the effects of all types of air 
attack.11
D’Olier, with Paul Nitze as his 
vice chair, began to assemble a 
team for Japan. In the fall of 1945, 
the US Chiefs of Staff invited the 
British to send their own mission to 
Japan. The British had participated 
in the European survey 12 and gladly 
accepted the offer. The British had 
contributed signiﬁcantly to the US 
led effort to create the atomic bomb 
and were especially keen to assess 
the scope of atomic damage to an 
island nation for their own post war 
strategic planning.13 
 The British Chiefs of Staff quickly 
assembled the team, known as the 
British Mission to Japan (BMJ). It 
would be led by Professor W.N. 
Thomas, a civil engineer from Cardiff 
University in Wales, who had led 
many bomb damage assessment 
teams for the British Ministry of 
Home Security during the Blitz.14 
 In the fall of 1945, Solandt had 
become the Army Council’s scientiﬁc 
advisor in the War Ofﬁce. He was 
selected to represent the British 
army and instructed to investigate 
structural  damage to military 
institutions. As Solandt later recalled, 
however, “there were no military 
installations in either Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki so I spent most of my time 
studying casualties from a medical 
point of view.”15 Throughout his 
wartime experience Solandt had 
concerned himself with the nature 
of casualties. Solandt worked on 
blood research for bombing victims 
during the Blitz, corresponded with 
Home Security scientist Professor 
Solly Zuckerman on the nature of 
bombing casualties, and worked on 
many tank casualty reports himself 
at Lulworth.16 He would head one of 
the two ﬁeld units.
 During the mission, Solandt 
received a directive from the US 
Chiefs of Staff on the nature of 
relations between the two bodies. It 
emphasized the collaborative nature 
of the enterprise, and included the 
following points:
3. The activities of the British party 
will, therefore, be governed by the 
terms of reference of the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey. 
You should in consultation with 
Professor Thomas, head of the 
Civil Defence party, arrange 
with M. Franklin D’Olier, the 
Chairman of the U.S.S.B.S., how 
to make the best use of your 
particular qualiﬁcations, bearing 
in mind…the special importance 
of studying the results of the two 
atom bomb incidents at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. 
Colonel Omand Solandt photographed 
shortly after his arrival in Hiroshima, 
Japan.
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policies to have the same kind of 
impartial and expert study of the 
effects of our aerial efforts in the 
war against Japan. This study would 
include the effects of all types of air 
attack.11
D’Olier, with Paul Nitze as his 
vice chair, began to assemble a 
team for Japan. In the fall of 1945, 
the US Chiefs of Staff invited the 
British to send their own mission to 
Japan. The British had participated 
in the European survey 12 and gladly 
accepted the offer. The British had 
contributed signiﬁcantly to the US 
led effort to create the atomic bomb 
and were especially keen to assess 
the scope of atomic damage to an 
island nation for their own post war 
strategic planning.13 
 The British Chiefs of Staff quickly 
assembled the team, known as the 
British Mission to Japan (BMJ). It 
would be led by Professor W.N. 
Thomas, a civil engineer from Cardiff 
University in Wales, who had led 
many bomb damage assessment 
teams for the British Ministry of 
Home Security during the Blitz.14 
 In the fall of 1945, Solandt had 
become the Army Council’s scientiﬁc 
advisor in the War Ofﬁce. He was 
selected to represent the British 
army and instructed to investigate 
structural  damage to military 
institutions. As Solandt later recalled, 
however, “there were no military 
installations in either Hiroshima or 
Nagasaki so I spent most of my time 
studying casualties from a medical 
point of view.”15 Throughout his 
wartime experience Solandt had 
concerned himself with the nature 
of casualties. Solandt worked on 
blood research for bombing victims 
during the Blitz, corresponded with 
Home Security scientist Professor 
Solly Zuckerman on the nature of 
bombing casualties, and worked on 
many tank casualty reports himself 
at Lulworth.16 He would head one of 
the two ﬁeld units.
 During the mission, Solandt 
received a directive from the US 
Chiefs of Staff on the nature of 
relations between the two bodies. It 
emphasized the collaborative nature 
of the enterprise, and included the 
following points:
3. The activities of the British party 
will, therefore, be governed by the 
terms of reference of the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey. 
You should in consultation with 
Professor Thomas, head of the 
Civil Defence party, arrange 
with M. Franklin D’Olier, the 
Chairman of the U.S.S.B.S., how 
to make the best use of your 
particular qualiﬁcations, bearing 
in mind…the special importance 
of studying the results of the two 
atom bomb incidents at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. 
4. You should not make any 
i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  r e s e a r c h , 
constructional or operational 
aspects of atomic bombing that are 
outside the scope of the U.S.S.B.S 
terms of reference.17
The mission left Britain on 11 
October and, after a week’s stay in 
Washington, arrived in Tokyo on 
27 October, where it was briefed on 
the effects of the atomic bomb by 
Japanese physicists and doctors who 
had been working with the American 
survey teams.18 The mission then 
spent an entire day ﬂying in a C-47, 
examining other bomb sites in Japan 
to assess the differences with the 
atomic devastation of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Solandt confessed that 
from the air only an expert could tell 
the difference between conventional 
and atomic bomb damage. The real 
work would have to be from the 
ground.19 Still, what they did see was 
“almost overwhelming. Each one 
of these cities had been extensively 
devastated.”20 
 On 31 October, the mission, now 
situated at the British Consulate, 
began its work in Nagasaki. The 
USSBS provided lodgings and jeep 
transportation but largely left the 
British mission to its own devices. 
It was then that Solandt, because 
there were no military institutions of 
signiﬁcance in Nagasaki, turned the 
team’s attention to casualty analysis.21 
He was joined in this effort by Jacob 
Bronowski, a renowned statistician 
adept at the mathematics of casualty 
surveys. Together, they investigated 
the number and nature of casualties 
from the atomic bomb in Nagasaki (2-
13 November) then Hiroshima (14-24 
November), Bronowski concentrating 
on the former and Solandt on the 
latter.22 
 Walking through the world’s ﬁrst 
atomic battleﬁeld was a life changing 
experience for both Solandt and 
Nagasaki – A general view of the area near the centre of the 
damage, which is to the left of the picture, only 300 yards away 
from the bridge. Note how little remains of the blasted and burnt 
Japanese dwellings. 
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Bronowski, and the two became good 
friends. Bronowski later recorded his 
impressions:
On a ﬁne November day in 1945, late 
in the afternoon, I was landed on 
an airstrip in Southern Japan. From 
there a jeep was to take me over the 
mountains to join a ship which lay 
in Nagasaki Harbour…suddenly I 
was aware that we were already at 
the centre of damage in Nagasaki. 
The shadows behind me were the 
skeletons of the Mitsubishi factory 
buildings, pushed backwards and 
sideways as if by a giant hand. What 
I had thought to be broken rocks was 
a concrete power house with its roof 
punched in. I could now make out the 
outline of two crumpled gasometers; 
there was a cold furnace festooned 
with service pipes; otherwise nothing 
but cockeyed telegraph poles and 
loops of wire in a bare waste of 
ashes. I had blundered into this 
desolate landscape as instantly as 
one might wake among the craters 
of the moon.23
 Solandt was likely driving the 
jeep. Looking back at his friendship 
with Bronowski during that period, 
he reﬂected
I realize that I was probably the more 
practical of the two, since when we 
were out together I drove while 
he planned. Incidentally, driving a 
large ¾ ton Dodge 4 x 4 in a ruined 
Japanese city requires as much 
concentration as writing poetry.24 
Solandt, in a letter to his family not 
long after the work began, reported 
that:
The damage is quite up to advance 
notices. The bomb lit in the northern 
part of the town where most of 
the factories are and completely 
devastated an area about one mile 
wide and 2 ½ miles long…I’ve been 
spending the last few days looking 
at the casualties that remain. They 
are a sorry looking lot since most 
of them have had practically no 
treatment. Fortunately most of the 
bad cases are dead and the others 
are getting better…The attitude of 
the Japs is quite amazing. They treat 
the Americans as welcome guests 
not as conquerors. The Americans 
in turn are very friendly especially to 
the kids. The kids are very attractive 
and spend most of their time talking 
to the troops. Kids about Sigrid’s 
[Solandt’s eldest daughter] age are 
to be seen carrying small brother 
or sister [sic] about on their backs 
all day – no wonder they grow up 
small and tough…I spent many 
several hours [in the previous days] 
looking at damage in the residential 
quarters – I have never seen such 
ﬁlth in all my life. It is a mystery how 
anyone survives. Every place is just 
full of dirty little kids with running 
noses and impetigo and probably 
ﬂeas. I had a bath immediately upon 
returning.25
Nagasaki:
Top: Mass distortion of steel-framed 
shed buildings about half a mile from 
the centre of damage. It can be seen 
that the entire main frame is seriously 
distorted away from the explosion.
Middle: This photo was taken 130 feet 
from ground level zero.
Bottom: The Roman Catholic Church 
600 yards from the centre of damage. 
The walls were of heavy load-bearing 
brick construction. Most of the damage 
is attributable to blast, although ﬁre 
subsequently consumed all combustible 
debris. The huts in the foreground were 
erected as temporary living quarters by 
the Japanese after the attack.
Nagasaki – Blast effect on a gasholder 
half a mile away from the centre of 
damage. Not the way in which the whole 
framework has been bent away from the 
explosion.
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buildings, pushed backwards and 
sideways as if by a giant hand. What 
I had thought to be broken rocks was 
a concrete power house with its roof 
punched in. I could now make out the 
outline of two crumpled gasometers; 
there was a cold furnace festooned 
with service pipes; otherwise nothing 
but cockeyed telegraph poles and 
loops of wire in a bare waste of 
ashes. I had blundered into this 
desolate landscape as instantly as 
one might wake among the craters 
of the moon.23
 Solandt was likely driving the 
jeep. Looking back at his friendship 
with Bronowski during that period, 
he reﬂected
I realize that I was probably the more 
practical of the two, since when we 
were out together I drove while 
he planned. Incidentally, driving a 
large ¾ ton Dodge 4 x 4 in a ruined 
Japanese city requires as much 
concentration as writing poetry.24 
Solandt, in a letter to his family not 
long after the work began, reported 
that:
The damage is quite up to advance 
notices. The bomb lit in the northern 
part of the town where most of 
the factories are and completely 
devastated an area about one mile 
wide and 2 ½ miles long…I’ve been 
spending the last few days looking 
at the casualties that remain. They 
are a sorry looking lot since most 
of them have had practically no 
treatment. Fortunately most of the 
bad cases are dead and the others 
are getting better…The attitude of 
the Japs is quite amazing. They treat 
the Americans as welcome guests 
not as conquerors. The Americans 
in turn are very friendly especially to 
the kids. The kids are very attractive 
and spend most of their time talking 
to the troops. Kids about Sigrid’s 
[Solandt’s eldest daughter] age are 
to be seen carrying small brother 
or sister [sic] about on their backs 
all day – no wonder they grow up 
small and tough…I spent many 
several hours [in the previous days] 
looking at damage in the residential 
quarters – I have never seen such 
ﬁlth in all my life. It is a mystery how 
anyone survives. Every place is just 
full of dirty little kids with running 
noses and impetigo and probably 
ﬂeas. I had a bath immediately upon 
returning.25
 The goal of the mission was to 
discover the number and nature of 
deaths in relation to the distance from 
the explosion and what structures 
were in the path of the shockwave 
and radiation.26 Japanese hospital 
records on casualties were scattered 
throughout the region but they were 
of almost no value. 
The rescue services were so slow in 
coming into action after the bombing 
and were so inadequate that no 
records were kept of the dead, injured, 
missing and evacuated people. 
The hospitals were so swamped 
with work that their records are 
of little value. The Japanese did 
make scattered attempts to keep 
records beginning a few days after 
the bombing but these were very 
incomplete.27 
 When he first arrived Solandt 
also received information from a 
US/Japanese Joint Commission 
for the Investigation of the Effects 
on the Atomic Bomb that worked 
under the direct authority of General 
Douglas McArthur, Supreme Allied 
Commander in the Paciﬁc.28 Solandt’s 
interpreter was a further source, 
supplying ﬁrst hand accounts of what 
had happened.
 Solandt classiﬁed casualties into 
four general categories:
1. Ordinary thermal burns due 
to direct radiation from the heated 
air around the explosives.
2. By irradiation with gamma 
rays and other  short-wave 
radiations.
3. By blast.
4. Secondary injuries due to 
being hurled against buildings 
or hit by buildings. Burns due to 
ﬁres should be included in this 
group.29
Solandt learned from the American/
Japanese team that out of a population 
of 250,000 there were 21,000 killed, 
1,000 missing, and 40,000 injured. 
All those out in the open and within 
1000 metres of the centre died, though 
the cause of death was difﬁcult to 
determine.30 
 Those who were 1000-2000 metres 
away received heavy doses of radiant 
heat and gamma rays. Thick clothing 
could screen against the former, 
but the latter could penetrate up to 
15 inches of concrete. Blast created 
minimal casualties at this range (10 
percent). Screening determined the 
nature of the casualties at this range. 
The lightly clothed, which was most 
people in the summer heat, suffered 
severe ﬂash burns and died before the 
radiation could kill them. Those who 
were more than 2000 meters away 
generally survived the flashburns 
Nagasaki:
Top: Mass distortion of steel-framed 
shed buildings about half a mile from 
the centre of damage. It can be seen 
that the entire main frame is seriously 
distorted away from the explosion.
Middle: This photo was taken 130 feet 
from ground level zero.
Bottom: The Roman Catholic Church 
600 yards from the centre of damage. 
The walls were of heavy load-bearing 
brick construction. Most of the damage 
is attributable to blast, although ﬁre 
subsequently consumed all combustible 
debris. The huts in the foreground were 
erected as temporary living quarters by 
the Japanese after the attack.
Nagasaki – Blast effect on a gasholder 
half a mile away from the centre of 
damage. Not the way in which the whole 
framework has been bent away from the 
explosion.
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but showed symptoms of irradiation, 
including epilation (hair removed 
from the roots).
 While investigating some cases 
of structural damage, Solandt came 
upon two Franciscans from Quebec, 
Father Prudent Moffette and Brother 
Moreau. They had been in Japan for 17 
years and were interned when the war 
broke out. Nagasaki, they claimed, 
had over 16,000 Roman Catholics 
and 8-10,000 were killed.31 Solandt 
also interviewed an eyewitness of 
the blast from the Tsuruoka Maru, a 
10,000 ton vessel that was 4, 000 yards 
away. 
Three of them were on the bridge 
at the time – watched the parachute 
come down and one went to get 
glasses to observe them more clearly. 
All were looking toward [the] bomb 
when it went off. They saw a bright 
white light – heard one loud bang 
followed by four smaller ones which 
they think were not echoes. The 
ship rocked violently but was not in 
any danger of capsizing. They did 
not emphasize any feeling of wind. 
Several others on the ship had mild 
ﬂash burns on exposed skin. A few 
had blisters on the their forearms. 
Next the whole area was covered 
with a white smoke which rose 
forming a bright ﬁery column which 
ended in a mushroom shaped head of 
white smoke. The bright white smoke 
rose and was followed by bluish 
smoke and then ﬂames. The ﬂames 
appeared within 1-2 minutes of the 
ﬁrst ﬂash. One man on the ship had 
his hat [black] charred by the ﬂash—
they disagreed about ﬂame on the 
hat. Trees on the east of the harbour 
were seen to burst into ﬂames within 
a minute or two. They also [saw] 
several small vessels between them 
and the bomb burning. 32
 The entire mission was a rushed 
affair. The British were eager to get 
as much ﬁrst hand data as possible to 
make their own independent analysis 
so that they would not have to rely 
entirely on US data. In preparing his 
reports, Solandt was adamant that the 
British Chiefs of Staff understand that 
the initial reports were preliminary 
at best and would be superceded 
by the final report.33 Solandt and 
Bronowski worked on at least three 
drafts before completing the report 
“Casualties Due to the Atomic Bomb 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki” in late 
November. This paper was included 
in the ﬁnal report of the Mission, The 
Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (1946).34 
 The most important point made 
by Bronowski and Solandt was that 
at both cities civil defence measures, 
physical shelters and a proper 
organization had been virtually non-
existent. Had such measures been 
in place, the damage and casualties, 
although devastating, would have 
been less severe. Such views are not 
surprising for men who worked so 
extensively in British civil defence. 
Solandt and the Defence 
Research Board’s view of 
Atomic Bombs
Solandt returned to Canada via the continental US on 15 December 
and arrived in Ottawa three days 
later. He completed his journey to 
England on  23 December. During 
the stopover in Ottawa Lieutenant-
General Charles Foulkes, chief of the 
general staff since August, offered 
Solandt the job of director general of 
the new Defence Research Board.35 
 Foulkes was convinced that 
Canada’s post war defence required 
scientiﬁc research capabilities that 
speciﬁcally served the military. One 
of the key elements in Allied victory 
over the Axis during the Second 
World War had been a massive 
and concerted scientiﬁc effort that 
had been effectively applied to 
technology and operations. Canada 
had contributed significantly in 
many areas including radar and 
communications, explosives, and the 
research that had helped to develop 
the atomic bomb. The defection of 
Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in 
the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, in 
Hiroshima – A general view looking 
across the centre of damage. Some 
framed buildings quite near the centre 
remained standing. The foreground 
illustrates the remains of Japanese 
dwellings, razed to the ground.
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 The entire mission was a rushed 
affair. The British were eager to get 
as much ﬁrst hand data as possible to 
make their own independent analysis 
so that they would not have to rely 
entirely on US data. In preparing his 
reports, Solandt was adamant that the 
British Chiefs of Staff understand that 
the initial reports were preliminary 
at best and would be superceded 
by the final report.33 Solandt and 
Bronowski worked on at least three 
drafts before completing the report 
“Casualties Due to the Atomic Bomb 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki” in late 
November. This paper was included 
in the ﬁnal report of the Mission, The 
Effects of the Atomic Bombs at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (1946).34 
 The most important point made 
by Bronowski and Solandt was that 
at both cities civil defence measures, 
physical shelters and a proper 
organization had been virtually non-
existent. Had such measures been 
in place, the damage and casualties, 
although devastating, would have 
been less severe. Such views are not 
surprising for men who worked so 
extensively in British civil defence. 
Solandt and the Defence 
Research Board’s view of 
Atomic Bombs
Solandt returned to Canada via the continental US on 15 December 
and arrived in Ottawa three days 
later. He completed his journey to 
England on  23 December. During 
the stopover in Ottawa Lieutenant-
General Charles Foulkes, chief of the 
general staff since August, offered 
Solandt the job of director general of 
the new Defence Research Board.35 
 Foulkes was convinced that 
Canada’s post war defence required 
scientiﬁc research capabilities that 
speciﬁcally served the military. One 
of the key elements in Allied victory 
over the Axis during the Second 
World War had been a massive 
and concerted scientiﬁc effort that 
had been effectively applied to 
technology and operations. Canada 
had contributed significantly in 
many areas including radar and 
communications, explosives, and the 
research that had helped to develop 
the atomic bomb. The defection of 
Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in 
the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, in 
September 1945 had shaken the status 
quo.  This revelation of a concerted 
Soviet espionage campaign against 
Canada, Britain and the United States 
dimmed hopes for a stable, lasting 
peace built on cooperation among the 
wartime Allied powers and signaled 
the beginnings of the cold war. 
 Emerging technologies such as 
jet aircraft and rockets destroyed 
the illusion that Canada remained 
a “fire proof house” safe in its 
geographical isolation.  The Canadian 
military required scientiﬁc research 
capabilities.36 During the war, 
Canadian defence research had 
grown under the National Research 
Council (NRC) and its wartime 
President C.J. Mackenzie.37 After 
the war the NRC quickly divested 
itself of most defence projects, and 
Mackenzie supported Foulkes’s 
argument for a separate defence 
research establishment.38 
 Solandt was appointed director 
general defence research on 28 
December 1945. The Defence Research 
Board was subsequently “born” on 28 
March 1947 and integrated within 
the defence department under the 
National Defence Act. Its mandate was 
to serve the military, act as the chief 
repository of research knowledge for 
the minister of National Defence, and 
run its own research establishments. 
The director general of the DRB had 
an equivalent rank of lieutenant-
general, the same level as the chiefs 
Hiroshima – A general view looking 
across the centre of damage. Some 
framed buildings quite near the centre 
remained standing. The foreground 
illustrates the remains of Japanese 
dwellings, razed to the ground.
Hiroshima city hall, near ground level zero.
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of the three armed services, and 
was a full member of the chiefs of 
staff committee who participated 
in Cabinet Defence Committee 
meetings.39 
 Evidence about how Solandt 
was selected is largely anecdotal. 
His name was initially suggested to 
Foulkes by Solandt’s mentor Charles 
Best, who had worked on wartime 
medical research projects for the 
Canadian military.40 Upon Solandt’s 
retirement from the DRB in 1956, 
Mackenzie shared with him his own 
recollections: 
I don’t know whether you ever knew 
the details but a group of us met in 
C.D.’s [Howe, minister of Munitions 
and Supply] ofﬁce to decide whether 
or not to separate military and 
normal N.R.C. activities. The Cabinet 
Ministers agreed to such a decision 
and the next question arose as to 
who would head the organization. 
[Lieutenant-General]  Charles 
Foulkes [chief of the general staff] 
and I were appointed a Committee 
to make recommendations. As we 
left C.D.’s office and went down 
the corridor Charles said “The 
only Canadian that I know who 
has any connection with defence 
research and who would likely be 
available is a man called Omond 
Solandt.” I immediately said “That 
is interesting because I have had him 
recommended to me by many people 
whose judgment I respect and I had 
intended to suggest the same name.” 
We stopped immediately and said 
why don’t we go back at once and 
make our recommendations, which 
we did. I doubt if any recommending 
Committee ever acted so soon after 
their appointment and I don’t think 
any recommendation ever proved a 
better one.41
 By 1946 Canadian policy towards 
nuclear weapons was already taking 
shape. Canada had participated 
in various scientific efforts that 
contributed to the making of 
the atomic bomb. This included 
membership in the Combined Policy 
Committee that had coordinated 
atomic research in the US, Canada 
and Britain. The end of the war forced 
Ottawa to review its participation 
in nuclear development. King and 
L.B. Pearson, Undersecretary of 
State for External Affairs had gone 
to Washington in 1945 after the 
atomic bombs had been dropped 
and told the US Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson that Canada 
would not pursue an independent 
atomic weapons policy.42 The passing 
of the McMahon Act by the US 
Congress in 1946 effectively ended 
US participation with Ottawa and 
London on atomic projects, outside 
of buying uranium products from 
the Canadian government’s crown 
corporation El Dorado.43 
 This did not mean Canada 
ignored atomic affairs. Political 
efforts were made towards a modus 
vivendi with the US on atomic affairs 
after the MacMahon act, and relations 
on defence science matters with 
Great Britain remained strong. The 
creation of the research reactor at 
Chalk River, Ontario continued 
despite the removal of key British 
scientists in the post war period. 
The Canadian military also began 
embryonic doctrine on dealing with 
the casualties resulting from atomic 
weapons. Indeed, the Canadian 
government was all too cognizant 
of the new atomic world that had 
been awakened at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.44 Solandt made it his goal 
as leader of the DRB to educate 
leading elements of Canadian society, 
both within and outside government, 
about the reality of atomic warfare 
and what it meant to Canada in 
military and civil defence terms.
 Among the many lectures Solandt 
gave in his ﬁrst year at the DRB was 
a presentation in Toronto on 24 
April 1947 to the Voluntary Health 
Committee of the House of Commons, 
a government committee concerned 
with medical affairs. The lecture 
took place against the backdrop of 
deepening international tensions. 
Soviet failure to remove troops from 
Iran in 1946 had created a war scare 
less than a year after victory in the 
Paciﬁc. Germany remained divided 
and its fate undecided. Stalin and his 
ministers refused to consider anything 
but weak neighbour states on their 
Polished concrete has been roughened 
by ﬂash heat effect at a distance of 
200 yards from the centre of damage 
in Hiroshima. The polish remains only 
where shielded by (a) a man seated on 
the steps; (b) a man leaning against the 
corner of the plinth adjoining the steps; 
and (c) in the shadows of the plinth 
mouldings.
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in nuclear development. King and 
L.B. Pearson, Undersecretary of 
State for External Affairs had gone 
to Washington in 1945 after the 
atomic bombs had been dropped 
and told the US Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson that Canada 
would not pursue an independent 
atomic weapons policy.42 The passing 
of the McMahon Act by the US 
Congress in 1946 effectively ended 
US participation with Ottawa and 
London on atomic projects, outside 
of buying uranium products from 
the Canadian government’s crown 
corporation El Dorado.43 
 This did not mean Canada 
ignored atomic affairs. Political 
efforts were made towards a modus 
vivendi with the US on atomic affairs 
after the MacMahon act, and relations 
on defence science matters with 
Great Britain remained strong. The 
creation of the research reactor at 
Chalk River, Ontario continued 
despite the removal of key British 
scientists in the post war period. 
The Canadian military also began 
embryonic doctrine on dealing with 
the casualties resulting from atomic 
weapons. Indeed, the Canadian 
government was all too cognizant 
of the new atomic world that had 
been awakened at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.44 Solandt made it his goal 
as leader of the DRB to educate 
leading elements of Canadian society, 
both within and outside government, 
about the reality of atomic warfare 
and what it meant to Canada in 
military and civil defence terms.
 Among the many lectures Solandt 
gave in his ﬁrst year at the DRB was 
a presentation in Toronto on 24 
April 1947 to the Voluntary Health 
Committee of the House of Commons, 
a government committee concerned 
with medical affairs. The lecture 
took place against the backdrop of 
deepening international tensions. 
Soviet failure to remove troops from 
Iran in 1946 had created a war scare 
less than a year after victory in the 
Paciﬁc. Germany remained divided 
and its fate undecided. Stalin and his 
ministers refused to consider anything 
but weak neighbour states on their 
borders, and pursued aggressive 
diplomacy in the Mediterranean. 
On 12 March 1947, just weeks before 
Solandt’s presentation in Toronto, 
President Truman, responding to a 
British request to take up Britain’s 
role in Mediterranean affairs, had 
proclaimed the “Truman Doctrine” 
– the US would support those that 
opposed the inﬂuence of Moscow. A 
new war, in the atomic age, seemed 
very possible.45 
 Solandt began his lecture by 
emphasizing that Canadians still 
found active warfare in North 
America difficult to comprehend, 
and that this complacency was 
dangerous:
In thinking about the bomb, it is 
therefore essential to realize that 
present developments in aircraft, 
and future development in rockets, 
will make it possible to attack this 
country from the air from almost any 
part of the world. The old days when 
we could feel secure behind oceans 
patrolled by friendly and powerful 
navies are gone. We must consider 
atomic bombs and other weapons of 
the future, not merely as weapons 
that might be used in the destruction 
of some enemy on distant shores, 
but as weapons that might at any 
time be used to destroy our homes 
and cities.46 
Polished concrete has been roughened 
by ﬂash heat effect at a distance of 
200 yards from the centre of damage 
in Hiroshima. The polish remains only 
where shielded by (a) a man seated on 
the steps; (b) a man leaning against the 
corner of the plinth adjoining the steps; 
and (c) in the shadows of the plinth 
mouldings.
A British ofﬁcer poses in a Japanese defensive position in Hiroshima.
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 Solandt then explored the 
lethality of atomic weapons, based 
on the reports of the British Mission, 
USSBS, and his own observations 
from his time in Japan. He told the 
crowd he intended to make a clinical 
analysis and suggested they read John 
Hershey’s bestselling book Hiroshima 
for accurate personal accounts. 
 S o l a n d t  e m p h a s i z e d  t h a t 
atomic bombs caused casualties in 
significantly different ways than 
regular high explosives. They could, 
of course, injure by direct wounds 
from the fragments of the bomb, by 
blowing bits of buildings against 
people, and people against buildings, 
or from direct blast, like HE bombs. 
What made the atomic bomb unique 
was its release of vast quantities of 
energy, both in the blast wave and 
as radiant energy. The radiant energy 
released extended through the entire 
spectrum and included light, heat and 
penetrating gamma rays. The radiant 
heat caused severe burns and gamma 
rays produced “delayed death by 
injury to the blood forming organs.”47 
Solandt warned that estimates of the 
deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were tentative at best, but provided 
the following ﬁgures: 
15-20% died as a result of gamma 
radiation. 
20-30% died of ﬂash burns.
50-60% were killed from falling 
buildings.48 
 Solandt excluded from his 
analysis deaths resulting from 
collapsed structures. “We have 
become hardened to descriptions 
of this sort as a result of years of 
bombing in many lands. The injuries 
by burns and gamma rays possess the 
added interest of novelty.”49
 He further explained:
The heat liberated during the second 
or so during which the explosion 
lasted was so intense that people at 
distances up to two and half or three 
miles suffered burns not unlike a 
very severe sunburn. People directly 
under the bomb were actually charred 
black. The heat was of such short 
duration that buildings and even light 
clothing gave complete protection. 
The effect was as if a spotlight had 
been turned on the victims and 
they had been burned wherever the 
light fell on their exposed skin… 
Some people achieved a somewhat 
limited immortality when the heat 
permanently etched their shadow 
upon the roads and buildings.50
 Gamma rays, Solandt continued, 
penetrate through human tissue. This 
includes bone marrow, the spleen, 
and lymph nodes, places where blood 
cells are formed. The gamma rays 
killed the cells that normally divide to 
provide the body with new cells and 
death would occur within days or 
weeks, usually preceded by complete 
hair loss. Solandt also emphasized 
that many people recovered from 
gamma ray exposure. More tragically, 
all pregnant women within a mile 
of the bomb had miscarriages. No 
babies survived.51 
 Solandt attempted to simplify 
the complex effects of the bomb by 
focusing on one case study from his 
own experience. This was the group 
of 85 high school girls formed into a 
military unit in Hiroshima. 
Atomic bomb damage in Hiroshima.
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were tentative at best, but provided 
the following ﬁgures: 
15-20% died as a result of gamma 
radiation. 
20-30% died of ﬂash burns.
50-60% were killed from falling 
buildings.48 
 Solandt excluded from his 
analysis deaths resulting from 
collapsed structures. “We have 
become hardened to descriptions 
of this sort as a result of years of 
bombing in many lands. The injuries 
by burns and gamma rays possess the 
added interest of novelty.”49
 He further explained:
The heat liberated during the second 
or so during which the explosion 
lasted was so intense that people at 
distances up to two and half or three 
miles suffered burns not unlike a 
very severe sunburn. People directly 
under the bomb were actually charred 
black. The heat was of such short 
duration that buildings and even light 
clothing gave complete protection. 
The effect was as if a spotlight had 
been turned on the victims and 
they had been burned wherever the 
light fell on their exposed skin… 
Some people achieved a somewhat 
limited immortality when the heat 
permanently etched their shadow 
upon the roads and buildings.50
 Gamma rays, Solandt continued, 
penetrate through human tissue. This 
includes bone marrow, the spleen, 
and lymph nodes, places where blood 
cells are formed. The gamma rays 
killed the cells that normally divide to 
provide the body with new cells and 
death would occur within days or 
weeks, usually preceded by complete 
hair loss. Solandt also emphasized 
that many people recovered from 
gamma ray exposure. More tragically, 
all pregnant women within a mile 
of the bomb had miscarriages. No 
babies survived.51 
 Solandt attempted to simplify 
the complex effects of the bomb by 
focusing on one case study from his 
own experience. This was the group 
of 85 high school girls formed into a 
military unit in Hiroshima. 
At the time of the explosion they 
were at various places in the ground 
of Hiroshima Castle, a little more 
than half a mile from where the bomb 
exploded. Of a group of fifty one 
who were in the open engaged in a 
ceremony of devotion to the emperor, 
all were so severely burned that they 
died within a few days. Eight of 
the remainder were in the wooden 
dormitory where the group slept. Of 
these, two were killed by the falling 
buildings and one was knocked into 
a moat and downed. The remaining 
ﬁve were apparently uninjured as 
they had been protected from burns 
by the light building in which they 
were working. They all died in 12 to 
19 days from the effect of the gamma 
rays. The remaining twenty six 
girls, operating the Army telephone 
exchange, in a deep concrete shelter, 
were uninjured.52 
 Solandt’s occasionally dark sense 
of humour almost got the best of him 
in the original draft of this lecture. 
He deleted two “grim but interesting 
jokes” played by fate in the dropping 
of the atomic bomb. In one case a 
considerable percentage of Japanese 
prison inmates were sterilized 
by gamma rays from the bomb, 
“thus achieving a result that ardent 
advocates of eugenics have never 
been able to bring about.” Then there 
was the case of a Japanese professor 
of radiology at Nagasaki medical 
Omond Solandt.
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school. The man had been slowly 
dying from leukemia; “proper x-ray 
treatment to prolong his life was not 
available in Japan.” When the bomb 
went off, he was at such a distance 
that the dosage of gamma rays would 
have likely have prolonged his life. 
Unfortunately, he was standing in 
front of a lead screen at the time. He 
died of the leukemia a few weeks 
later.53 
 Solandt proceeded with a slide 
show to explore and illustrate 
the effects of such weapons on a 
Canadian city. “In order to simplify 
the problem of visualizing the 
damage the hypothetical bomb 
has been exploded directly over our 
auditorium.”54 The zero point was 
the corner of College and Yonge in 
downtown Toronto. “There would 
be 30,000 houses damaged beyond 
repair,” he concluded:
35,000 requiring extensive repair and 
50-100,000 requiring ﬁrst-aid repairs. 
This would result in about 400,000 
people being rendered homeless. 
About half of these could return to 
their homes after temporary repairs. 
Of the remaining 200,000 about 50,000 
would have been killed and an equal 
number would require prolonged 
hospital treatment. This leaves about 
100,000 who would require to be 
rehoused [sic] either permanently 
of for the several months required to 
make major repairs. It is not possible 
to appreciate the significance of 
such ﬁgures at ﬁrst glance. As you 
consider them, new and terrible 
implications appear. Just think, for 
instance, of the added suffering if 
such an incident occurred in sub-zero 
weather.55
As the crowd considered these 
ﬁgures, a movie on Hiroshima was 
shown.
 Solandt next examined the nature 
of the atomic bomb as a weapon. He 
made it clear that, as the Mission 
and USSBS reports had concluded, 
it had “tremendous but not unique 
destructive powers. The devastation 
wrought by ordinary HE bombs in 
Hamburg and by incendiaries in 
Tokyo was just as great as that in 
Hiroshima.” Atomic bombs were 
expensive to make but cheap to use, 
reducing the cost of destroying cities 
to would be aggressors as well as 
accelerating the rate at which cities, 
like Toronto, could be destroyed. 
“This tremendous increase in the rate 
of destruction is probably the most 
important new factor that the atomic 
bomb as introduced to war.”56 There 
now existed a relatively inexpensive 
way for aggressors with global reach 
to destroy cities. 
 “We must,” Solandt declared, 
“either be continually prepared for 
war or else eliminate the possibility 
of war.” The latter was a very faint 
hope.
Until wars cease to occur we must be 
prepared to defend ourselves against 
all forms of attack including atomic 
bombs. I do not subscribe to the 
views that there is no defence against 
the atomic bomb. At least for the 
next few years atomic bombs will be 
carried in ordinary bombers which 
can be intercepted and destroyed just 
as in the past. When the long range 
rocket carrying an atomic warhead 
becomes a reality, there is little doubt 
that there be some means of defence 
against it. In addition to this active 
defence which is the responsibility of 
the Armed Forces, much can be done 
in the ﬁeld of Civil Defence. Here 
the important measures will include 
psychological preparation of the 
people, so that attack will not weaken 
our will to resist; careful planning 
of the location of new buildings and 
industries of national importance 
and the preparation of plans for 
rescue and repair services and for 
the treatment of casualties.57
 Solandt ended his lecture on a 
positive note. He championed the 
efforts by General A.G.L. McNaughton, 
Canada’s representative on the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 
to regulate the creation and use of 
nuclear weapons, and called for the 
active pursuit of the elimination of 
war. As a doctor and a scientist, he 
had seen the terriﬁc beneﬁts from 
knowledge applied to relieve human 
suffering. War no doubt seemed 
the antithesis to such endevours. 
Indeed, Solandt would spend the 
greater part of his life championing 
the use of science and technology to 
alleviate hunger and poverty in the 
third world. Solandt saw the United 
Nations (UN) as a possible problem 
solver of the dilemmas facing the 
world. But Solandt was also a realist. 
“Russian Imperialists” and their use 
of communist ideology threatened 
world stability and had to be faced, 
even in a world with atomic weapons. 
This mix of the scientists’ belief in 
rational solutions and progress and 
a Cold Warrior’s realism led Solandt 
to a hopeful pragmatism concerning 
Canada’s fate in the atomic age. 
War is still possible, and if we really 
believe in our cause we must be 
prepared to ﬁght for it if necessary. 
We must even make preparations for 
the possibility of atomic bombs being 
dropped on Canadian cities, but 
such preparations must always be 
regarded as secondary in importance 
to our primary task of helping to 
evolve a wold organization that will 
make war impossible.58
Conclusion 
In 1945 Omond Solandt became a chief contributor to Canada’s 
early Cold War defence policy. As 
Chairman of the Defence Research 
Board, he maintained and oversaw 
the nation’s ﬁrst peacetime defence 
research establishment, served the 
defence research interests of the 
Canadian Armed Forces, and provided 
the minister of National Defence 
critical scientiﬁc and technological 
knowledge. He brought to these tasks 
a vast, sharp and diverse intellect that 
reﬂected his interests and experience, 
the most compelling at the time being 
his work in Nagasaki and Hiroshima 
in the wake of the world’s ﬁrst atomic 
attacks. 
 B e c a u s e  o f  h i s  u n i q u e 
qualiﬁcations and life choices, Solandt 
arrived in Ottawa as Canada’s chief 
expert on the effects of atomic 
weapons. His timing was impeccable. 
Solandt became director general 
of the DRB just as the relationship 
between Moscow and the west 
soured under Soviet intransigence 
and adventurism in the Middle East 
and the Mediterranean. As one of his 
ﬁrst lectures of 1947 shows, Solandt 
feared the consequences of atomic 
weapons but he feared ignorance of 
their effect even more. Looking at the 
future from the start of the Cold War, 
Solandt mined his experience to paint 
a picture for his audience of hard 
realities and the need to face them 
despite the costs. Hope remained in 
the UN, but as they say in the Army 
hope is not a method. Knowledge of 
the realities of atomic weapons was 
the ﬁrst step in coming to grips with 
their place in the world. Solandt, 
while not a fan of fiction, would 
no doubt have championed science 
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of the location of new buildings and 
industries of national importance 
and the preparation of plans for 
rescue and repair services and for 
the treatment of casualties.57
 Solandt ended his lecture on a 
positive note. He championed the 
efforts by General A.G.L. McNaughton, 
Canada’s representative on the United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 
to regulate the creation and use of 
nuclear weapons, and called for the 
active pursuit of the elimination of 
war. As a doctor and a scientist, he 
had seen the terriﬁc beneﬁts from 
knowledge applied to relieve human 
suffering. War no doubt seemed 
the antithesis to such endevours. 
Indeed, Solandt would spend the 
greater part of his life championing 
the use of science and technology to 
alleviate hunger and poverty in the 
third world. Solandt saw the United 
Nations (UN) as a possible problem 
solver of the dilemmas facing the 
world. But Solandt was also a realist. 
“Russian Imperialists” and their use 
of communist ideology threatened 
world stability and had to be faced, 
even in a world with atomic weapons. 
This mix of the scientists’ belief in 
rational solutions and progress and 
a Cold Warrior’s realism led Solandt 
to a hopeful pragmatism concerning 
Canada’s fate in the atomic age. 
War is still possible, and if we really 
believe in our cause we must be 
prepared to ﬁght for it if necessary. 
We must even make preparations for 
the possibility of atomic bombs being 
dropped on Canadian cities, but 
such preparations must always be 
regarded as secondary in importance 
to our primary task of helping to 
evolve a wold organization that will 
make war impossible.58
Conclusion 
In 1945 Omond Solandt became a chief contributor to Canada’s 
early Cold War defence policy. As 
Chairman of the Defence Research 
Board, he maintained and oversaw 
the nation’s ﬁrst peacetime defence 
research establishment, served the 
defence research interests of the 
Canadian Armed Forces, and provided 
the minister of National Defence 
critical scientiﬁc and technological 
knowledge. He brought to these tasks 
a vast, sharp and diverse intellect that 
reﬂected his interests and experience, 
the most compelling at the time being 
his work in Nagasaki and Hiroshima 
in the wake of the world’s ﬁrst atomic 
attacks. 
 B e c a u s e  o f  h i s  u n i q u e 
qualiﬁcations and life choices, Solandt 
arrived in Ottawa as Canada’s chief 
expert on the effects of atomic 
weapons. His timing was impeccable. 
Solandt became director general 
of the DRB just as the relationship 
between Moscow and the west 
soured under Soviet intransigence 
and adventurism in the Middle East 
and the Mediterranean. As one of his 
ﬁrst lectures of 1947 shows, Solandt 
feared the consequences of atomic 
weapons but he feared ignorance of 
their effect even more. Looking at the 
future from the start of the Cold War, 
Solandt mined his experience to paint 
a picture for his audience of hard 
realities and the need to face them 
despite the costs. Hope remained in 
the UN, but as they say in the Army 
hope is not a method. Knowledge of 
the realities of atomic weapons was 
the ﬁrst step in coming to grips with 
their place in the world. Solandt, 
while not a fan of fiction, would 
no doubt have championed science 
ﬁction author Isaac Asimov’s famous 
quip as it pertained to Canada’s view 
of atomic weapons: 
If knowledge can create problems, it 
is not through ignorance that we can 
solve them. 
For Solandt, knowledge of the reality 
of atomic warfare was the necessary 
ﬁrst step towards sustainable peace 
or resolve in war. 
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